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Abstract
Binmore at.al. (1987) show that the Nash (1950) solution emerges
as a limit point of a two player alternating o¤ers bargaining game when
the time di¤erence between o¤ers goes to zero. Krishna and Serrano
(1996) establish the same result in the n¡player cake sharing set up.
Kultti and Vartiainen (2003) argue that noncooperative bargaining
behavior á la Krishna-Serrano can be compactly described by means of
von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. This paper analyses the general
problem. We show that a stable set exists and converges to the Nash
solution in any smooth, compact and convex problem. A connection
to the generalized Krishna-Serrano game is also established.
1 Introduction
An n¡player bargaining problem is de…ned by an n¡dimensional compact,
comprehensive, and convex utility possibility set U . Nash’s (1950) solution
is without doubt the most commonly accepted cooperative solution to the
problem.1 But this constitutes only part of the story; a more complete the-
ory would explain why the Nash solution emerges also in the noncooperative
framework.
¤We grateful for Hannu Salonen for stimulating discussions.
yCorresponding author: Ludviginkatu 3-5, FIN- 00130 Helsinki. E-mail:
hannu.vartiainen@yjs.….
1 For an authorative discussion on n-player bargaining theory, see Thomson and Lens-
berg (1989).
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Binmore, at. al. (1986) show that the Nash bargaining solution has a
noncooperative interpretation: the unique equilibrium outcome of the two-
player Rubinstein (1982) alternating o¤ers bargaining game converges to
the Nash solution when the time di¤erence between o¤ers becomes small.
However, Binmore et al are silent about the general n¡player bargaining
context, which is known to be qualitatively di¤erent from its two-player
counterpart (see e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990).
Krishna and Serrano (1996) [KS] tackle this problem by focusing on
model of n¡player alternating o¤ers bargaining in the cake sharing context.
The decisive feature of KS is that any player may exit the game after he
has accepted an o¤er regardless of the other players’ acceptance decisions.
Thus unanimity is not needed for an allocation-o¤er to become executed.
KS shows that the game induces a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, and
that this equilibrium converges to the Nash bargaining solution as the time
intervall becomes small.
Kultti and Vartiainen (2003) [KV] point out that noncooperative bar-
gaining behavior á la KS can be captured in reduced form by means of
vonNeumann-Morgenstern (1944) stability concept.2 They demonstrate that
a stable set of the n¡player cake sharing problem is geometrically intimitely
related to theKS equilibrium allocations that are indexed by the …rst-moving
player. It is proven that a stable set exists, is unique, and converges to the
Nash bargaining solution as the time interval becomes small.
KS and KV crucially rely on the physical structure of the cake divi-
sion problem that allows two players to compare utilities without a¤ecting
a third player’s payo¤. This property, which precludes all kinds of external-
ities at the outset, together with standard assumptions on players’ utility
functions imply resource monotonicity of a solution to the problem. Re-
source monotonicicity, in turn, drives the uniqueness result. For example in
the presence of externalities, this need not be the case. The relation between
stable set and the Nash bargaining solution in the general case is still an
open question.
Our aim is to tackle the general problem. First we show that a stable
set always exists and converges to the Nash bargaining solution. Then we
demonstrate the link between stable set and the Krishna-Serrano (1996)
bargaining framework. As no assumptions are made as regards to the un-
derlying physical environment,3 a most general noncooperative foundation
for the Nash bargaining is solution is provided.
2 For review, see Owen (1989).
3 Except that it induces a smooth bargaining problem.
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Outline of the Argument Speci…cally, the stable set solution is de-
rived by assuming the following. Any player may impose an objection to a
division of utilities by demanding a new division. It takes one period before
any such demand may materialize. By this simple structure, a dominance
relation over the divisions of utilities is created: division u is dominated by
division v if and and only if the discounted value of v exceeds the current
value u; for some player.
With short enough period, it is clear that there are no undominated
divisions. What do reasonable, or stable, outcomes then look like? We
focus on a subset of all divisions, the stable set, which has the properties
that, …rst, any element of the stable set can only be dominated by an element
outside the set and, second, any element outside the stable set is dominated
by some element of the set.
First we characterize a stable set. A stable set is characterized by a
minimal point u such that points in U above u constitute a stable set. It
also contains n "maximal points" u1; :::; un that induce the highest possible
payo¤ in the stable set for each 1; :::;n: Player i’s maximal point satis…es
ui = (±¡1i ui; u¡i): Then we prove the existence of a stable set. Finally, we
prove that any stable set converges to the (asymmetric) Nash bargaining
solution as the time interval becomes small.
To understand the relationship between stable set and a noncooperative
bargaining framework,4 note that a key feature of any bargaining model is
that before any tentative outcome is implemented, players should be able to
resume in one form or another the negotiation process. Thus any (equilib-
rium) outcome of the bargaining process must be such that players would
rather implement this outcome than induce another outcome that they know
would be implemented. On the other hand, if a particular outcome cannot
be implemented (in equilibrium), then there must be an (equilibrium) out-
come that some player wants to, and is able to, induce. The remaining
question is which players should be in the position to resume the negotia-
tion process. In this respect we do not want to be too dogmatic. Assuming
that any player can resume the negotiation process, it becomes clear that
the conditions for inducable outcomes are isomorphic under stable set and
noncooperative approcahes. Thus, also the set of inducable outcomes must
coincide.
This intuitive connection between stable set and the noncooperative equi-
libria of a bargaining game is established in a bargaining model that is moti-
4 Greenberg (1990) o¤ers a comprehensive analysis of the connections between nonco-
operative models and stable set.
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vated by Krishna-Serrano (1996). The game is de…ned recursively as follows.
Players make sequential o¤ers (say, in ascending order) in terms of utility
allocations. Any player is permitted to implement the utility that is pro-
posed to him by accepting the o¤er. A rejection leads to a subgame where
the next player of those who reject the previous o¤er makes a proposal. A
proposer’s utility allocation is implemented only if all reponders accept the
o¤er.
We show that any Markov equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game
coincides with a maximal point of a stable set. On the other hand, there
always exists a stable set whose maximal point coincides with a Markov
equilibrium outcome of the noncooperative game. Thus we become to prove
that a Markov equilibrium of the Krishna-Serrano bargaining game exists
and that any Markov equilibrium converges to the Nash bargaining solution
even when no restrictions are placed on the structure of the environment.
First we give a characterization of any stable set. A stable set is convex
valued, and it has a simple and intuitive geometric representation. We then
show that a stable set always exists for any n¡player problem. Uniqueness
cannot be established without further assumptions. However, we show that
any stable set shrinks to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as the
time interval goes to zero.
2 The set up
There is set N = f1; :::;ng of players and a compact, convex and comprehen-
sive utility possibility set U ½ Rn+:56 Vector of realized utilities is denoted
by u = (u1; :::; un); or u = (ui; u¡i): For any u 2 U; let D(v) be the points
that Pareto dominate v 2 U :
D(v) := fu 2 U : u ¸ vg: (1)
For any u 2 U; D(u) is a compact and u¡comprehensive set: Weakly Pareto-
optimal outcomes P are then de…ned by P := fu 2 U : D(u) = fugg :
Bargaining takes place through objections against potential division of
utilities. An objection contains a speci…cation for new division. However,
there is one period dealy before an objection may become e¤ective. Delay is
5 Vector notation: x = y if x ¸ y for all i; x ¸ y i¤ x = y and not xi = yi for all i; and
x > y i¤ xi > yi for all i:
6 X ½ Rk is d¡comprehensive if x 2 X and x ¸ y ¸ d imply y 2 X: If d = 0; then X
is comprehensive.
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costly: The present value of player i’s next period utility ui is ui±¢i ; where
0 < ±i < 1 is the discount rate and ¢ ¸ 0 is the length of the period:7
Stabe set consists of a domain alternatives and dominace relation on this
set. In the current set up, we let the domain be U. Dominance relation Â
is de…ned as follows: u Â v i¤ ui±¢i > vi; for some i 2 N; for u;v 2 U: Set
G ½ U is stable if
² (External stability) u 62 G implies there is v 2 G s.t. v Â u;
² (Internal stability) u 2 G implies there is no v 2 G s.t. v Â u:
3 Characterization and Existence
3.1 Case ¢ = 0:
If ¢ = 0 then ±¢ = 1; and the family of stable sets has a simple structure.
Theorem 1 Let ¢ = 0: Then G is a stable set if and only if G = fug for
u 2 P:
Proof. "If". Take u 2 P and assume G = fug: Since G is singleton,
internal stability is met. External stability is met by the de…nition of Pareto-
optimality. Thus G is a stable set.
"Only if". Assume G is a stable set. By internal stability, G is singleton,
say G = fug. Suppose there is v such that v ¸ u: Then v 62 G and, by
external stability there is v0 2 G such that v0 Â v: But then also u Â v; a
contradiction. Thus u 2 P:
3.2 Case ¢ > 0:
Without loss of generality, …x ¢ = 1: Take u = (u1; :::;un); and call
(±¡1i ui; u¡i) the ±i¡extension of u 2 U:8 Denote by u a point whose all
±i¡extensions, for i = 1; :::; n; lie in the Pareto-frontier:
u :2 fu 2 U : (±¡1i ui;u¡i) 2 P; for all i 2 Ng: (2)
Occasionally, such allocation is called a ”minimal point”.
7 Discount factor ±i can be interpreted as probability of termination pi¢; where pi is
a Poisson rate. Now it is nonproblematic to assume that players’ preferences obey von
Neumann-Morgenstern assumptions.
8 The concepts are taken from Thomson - Lensberg (1989), Ch 8.
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Theorem 2 Set G ½ S is stable if and only if G = D(u).
Proof. For any G; for any i 2 N; let uii 2 R satisfy9
uii = supfui : u 2 Gg:
”If”: Assume that G = D(u). By construction, ui ¸ ui = uii±i ¸ vi±i;
for all i 2 N; for all u; v 2 D(u). Thus internal stability is met. Take
u =2 D(u): Then there is i such that ui > ui: This implies that also ui =
uii±i > ui: Since uii 2 D(u); also external stability is met.
”Only if”: Suppose G is a stable set. Then, by internal stability,[
i2N
fu 2 U : uii±i > uig µ U n G: (3)
On the other hand, by external stability,\
i2N
fu 2 U : uii±i · uig µ G: (4)
Since [
i2N
fu : uii±i > uig [
\
i2N
fu : uii±i · uig
= G [ (U n G)
= U;
we have that, in fact, (3) and (4) hold as equality. By (4), it follows that G
is a compact set. Then there is ui 2 P \ G such that (uii;ui¡i) = ui: Since
U is a comprehensive set; vector u± = (u11±1; :::;unn±n) is an element of U .
Thus, there is u = (u1; :::; un) 2 U such that uii±i = ui for all i 2 N: By
construction, then
G = fu : u ¸ ug:
But then G = D(u) for D meeting (1), and u meeting (2).
Thus now we know that any stable set has a particular structure. A
stable set is characterized by a minimal point u = (u1; :::; un) : points in
U above u constitute a stable set. Stable set contains n "maximal points"
u1; :::;un that induce the highest possible payo¤ in the stable set for each
1; :::;n: Player i’s maximal point satis…es ui = (±¡1i ui;u¡i): Stable set is a
convex set.
9 Note that stable set cannot be empty.
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The characterization leaves open the question of existence and unique-
ness of the solution. Indeed, it is well known that in many scenarios there
are many stable sets, and in others it fails to exist (see e.g. Owen 1995).
Denote the i¡maximal Pareto-optimal point given payo¤s u¡i of players
j 6= i by
uii(u) = maxfu0i : (u0i; u¡i) 2 Ug:
Note that if u 2 P; then uii(u) = ui:
Theorem 3 Stable set exists.
Proof. De…ne function g^i : U ! R+
gi(u) := ±iuii(u); for all (ui;u¡i) 2 U; for all i 2 N: (5)
By convexity of U; gi is a continuous function. Let g(¢) := (g1(¢); :::; gn(¢));
and de…ne function ¹x : U ! R+ such that
¹x(u) := maxfx 2 R : xg(u) 2 Ug; for all u 2 U:
By compactness of U , ¹x is well de…ned. Construct function g^i : U ! R+
g^i(u) := gi (u)minf¹x(u); 1g; for all u 2 U:
If minf¹x(u); 1g = 1; then g^(u) 2 U; and if minf¹x(u);1g = ¹x(u), then g^(u) =
¹x(u)g(u) 2 U: Thus,
g^(u) = (g^1(u); :::; g^n(u)) : U ! U:
By convexity of U; function ¹x is continuous: Thus g^ : U ! Rn+ is a continuous
function. By Brouwer’s Theorem, there is u 2 U such that
g^ (u) = u: (6)
If also
g (u) 2 U; (7)
then, g (u) = u: This implies that u satis…es condition (2), and that D(u) is
a stable set. Thus condition (7) needs to be checked.
Suppose (7) does not hold. Then
¹x(u) < 1: (8)
By (6) and (8),
u = g(u)¹x(u) 2 P: (9)
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This implies that uii(u) = ui; for all i 2 N: By (5) and convexity of U we
have
g(u) = (±1u11(u); :::; ±nu
n
n(u))
= (±1u1; :::; ±nun)
= ±u
2 U;
a contradiction. Thus g (u) 2 U , as required.
The Existence Theorem is based on the convexity of U .
Kultti and Vartiainen (2003) show that in the cake division problem,
which imposes a degree of independency on players’ payo¤s, the stable set
is unique.10 The method of proof is to …rst show that in any two-player
bargaining problem the solution is unique. Then we show that such solution
is monotonic w.r.t. to the size of the cake. This in turn implies that if there
are two distinct solutions for the general problem, then the minimal point of
one of them Pareto dominates the minimal point of the other, which cannot
be the case.
4 Relationship with the Nash solution
We now argue that there is a particular relation between a consistent parti-
tion and the Nash bargaining solution. Denote by G¢ a stable set when the
length of the period is ¢: We are mainly interested in the limit behavior of
G¢ when ¢ becomes small.
First, introduce a vector of weights ® = (®1; :::; ®n) where
®i =
¡1
log ±i
; for all i 2 N:
Denote the ®¡ weighted Nash solution by
u® := arg max
u2U
Y
i2N
u®ii : (10)
For any ¢ > 0; let u(¢) be the minimal point and u1(¢); :::; un(¢) the
maximal points of players 1; :::; n of a stable set G¢. Denote by
H(c) :=
(
(u1; :::;un) :
Y
i
u®ii = c
)
;
10 The result relies on the Fisburn-Rubinstein (1980) speci…cation of time consistent
preferences.
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a ®¡weighted hyperbola, indexed by c > 0:
Lemma 4 u1(¢); :::; un(¢) lie in the same hyperbola, for any ¢:
Proof. Recall thatY
i
uji (¢)
® =
Y
i
±¡¢®i ui(¢)
®i
Thus,
Y
i
uji(¢)
® = exp
(
¡¢®j log ±j +
X
i
®i log ui(¢)
)
= exp
(
¢ +
X
i
®i log ui(¢)
)
;
which is independent of j 2 N: Thus there is c = °°ui(¢)°°11 such that
fu1(¢); :::; un(¢)g ½ H(c):
First we establish that in the two-player case the Nash solution always
belongs to G¢.
Theorem 5 Let n = 2: Then u® 2 G¢ ; for all ¢ > 0:
Proof. By Lemma (4), u1(¢);u2(¢) 2 H(c) for some c 2 R++. Since
G¢ is a convex set, u 2 H(c0) \ U for any c0 ¸ c implies u 2 G¢: Since
u® 2 H(c0) \ U for some c00 > c; also u® 2 G¢::
An immediate corollary of the previous theorem is that since the stable
set necessarily becomes ”small” when ¢ tends to zero, and since the Nash
solution always belongs to the stable set, it follows thet the stable set actually
shrinks to the Nash solution as ¢ tends to zero.
Corollary 6 Let n = 2: Then
T
¢>0G¢ = fu®g:
11 Where k¢k is the norm.
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Proof. The distance between ui(¢) and u(¢) is (±¡¢i ¡ 1)ui(¢). Since
ui(¢) is bounded, this number goes to zero as ¢ becomes small. Since
ui(¢) 2 P for all ¢; u(¢) converges to some u¤: Since u® 2 G¢ = D(u(¢))
for all ¢; we have
T
¢>0 G¢ = fu®g:
Unfortunately, it need not be the case that x® 2 G¢ when n > 2;
G¢ \G¢0 may be empty, for some ¢;¢0 in such case. However, we are able
to establish a weaker convergence result.
Fix U, P and the correponding u®: Before establishing the main result
of this paper, we characterize the Nash solution in a more general case in
the spirit of Corollary 6. De…ne a triangular problem T by the property that
there is speci…c a 2 Rn+ and c 2 R+ such that T = fu 2 Rn+ : a ¢ u · cg:12
For given triangular problem T; denote by GT¢ the correponding stable set
under ¢: Take u 2 P: Given that P is smooth, there is one and only one
triangular problem T (u) such that P ½ T (u) and u lies on the boundary of
T(u):
Proposition 7 Assume P is smooth: Then
T
¢>0 G
T(u)
¢ = fug if and only
if u = u®:
Proof. Let u®T be the Nash solution of a triangular problem T: ThenT
¢>0 GT¢ = fu®T g: Note that u®T = u® if and only if T = T (u®): Thus u = u®
implies
T
¢>0G
T(u)
¢ = fu®T g. On the other hand, u 6= u® implies u®T(u) 6= u®:
But then u®T(u) 62 P; and hence
T
¢>0G
T(u)
¢ 6= fug:
Stable set G¢ converges to fug in the Hausdor¤ metric as ¢ ! 0,
denoted by G¢ ! fug; if for any open ball with radius " around u 2 S;
denoted by B"(u); there is ¢" such that G¢ ½ B"(u) for all ¢ < ¢": We
show that in any situation the stable set converges to the asymmetric Nash
solution as ¢ becomes small.
Theorem 8 Assume P is smooth. Then G¢ ! fu®g as ¢ ! 0:
Proof. For any ¢ > 0; let u(¢) be the minimal point and u1(¢); :::; un(¢)
the maximal points of players 1; :::; n of a stable set G¢. By construction,
fu1(¢); :::;un(¢)g ½ P:
12 Where "¢" denotes the inner product.
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Take any sequence
©
¢k
ª
such that ¢k ! 0: Since U is bounded and since
the distance (±¡¢ki ¡1)ui(¢k) between any ui(¢k) and u(¢k) tends to zero
as ¢k becomes small, there is subsequence f¢lg such that, for some u¤ 2 P;
u(¢l) ! u¤;
ui(¢l) ! u¤; for all i = 1; :::; n: (11)
It su¢ces to show that u¤ = u® for any convergence point u¤:
Suppose that u¤ 6= u®: Since H(ku¤k) and P are surfaces ofn-dimensional
convex sets in Rn, and thus themselves n ¡ 1 dimensional manifolds, their
intersection P \H(u¤) is an n¡2 dimensional manifold. Since u¤ 6= u®; and
P is smooth, there is a unique a n ¡ 2 dimensional hyperplane L(u¤) that
supports P \ H(u¤) at u¤:13
For any v 2 U; denote by B¸(v) an open ball around v with radius ¸:
For any c 2 Rn+; write cx = (c1x1; :::; cnxn) and cX = fcx : x 2 Xg; for any
x 2 X ½ Rn+: Note that L(cv) = cL(v) and H(kcvk) = cH(kvk):
By smoothness of P , for any "; ¹;¸ > 0 and there exists k 2 R+ such
that
" > sup
n
ku ¡ vk : v 2 B¸=k(u¤)\ L(u¤) ;
for all u 2 B¸=k(u¤) \ P \ H(°°u0°°) ;
for all u0 2 B¹=k(u¤)
o
:
Analogously, for any ";¹;¸ > 0 there exists big enough c 2 Rn+ such that
" > sup
n
ku¡ vk : v 2 B¸(cu¤) \ L(cu¤) ; (12)
for all u 2 B¸(cu¤) \ cP \ H(°°cu0°°) ;
for.all u0 2 B¹(cu¤)ª :
Construct c(¢) = (c1(¢); :::; cn(¢)) such that
ci(¢) =
1
(±¡¢ ¡ 1)ui(¢)
; for all i 2 N:
13 For let P1 and P2 be smooth surfaces of n dimensional manifolds. Suppose P1 and P2
intersect at u: Then P1 and P2 have at tangering hyperplanes of dimension n ¡ 1: If P1
and P2 intersect at u; then the intersection L1(u)\ L(u2) of the tangering hyperplanes of
P1 and P2 at u has dimension n¡ 2:
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Note that since u(¢) converges to u¤ and ±¡¢i converges to 1; cii(¢) is
monotonically increasing below some ¢0: Denote the symmetric n ¡ 1 di-
mensional standard simplex by14
T =
n
x 2 Rn+ :
X
xi = 1
o
:
Now15
cofc(¢)u1(¢); :::; c(¢)un(¢)g = c(¢)u(¢) +T:
Thus the maximal points span an n ¡ 1 dimensional standard simplex with
edge length
p
n ¡ 1:
Take any ";¹ > 0: By (12), there is ¢" such that for all ¢ < ¢";
" > sup
n
ku ¡ vk : v 2 Bpn¡1(c(¢)u¤) \L(c(¢)u¤) ; (13)
for all u 2 Bpn¡1(c(¢)u¤)\ c(¢)P \ H(°°u0°°);
for all u0 2 B¹(c(¢)u¤)ª :
Invoke sequence f¢lg: By construction,
c(¢)u(¢)+T ½ Bpn¡1(c(¢0)ui(¢l))\c(¢0)P\c(¢0)H(
°°°ui(¢l)°°°); for all ¢l :
By (11), there is ¢0" < ¢" such that, for all ¢l < ¢0"; ui(¢l) 2 B¹(c(¢0)u¤) and
c(¢l)u(¢l) +T ½ Bpn¡1(c(¢0)u¤) \ c(¢0)P \ c(¢0)H(
°°°ui(¢l)°°°) :
By (13), for all ¢l < ¢0";
c(¢l)u(¢l) +T ½ fu : ku ¡ vk < "; v 2 L(c(¢l)u¤)g;
or
T ½ fu : ku ¡ vk < " +¹; for v 2 L(c(¢l)u¤¡ u¤)g:
Since this holds for all ";¹ > 0 it follows that n ¡ 1 dimensional manifold is
contained by an n ¡ 2 dimensional hyperplane, a contradiction.
The intuition of the proof can be summarized as follows. Assume that
the number of players is 3 (n). Since a stable set shrinks as ¢ becomes small,
a convergence point u¤ in the boundary exists. Suppose that u¤ is not u®:
Then u¤ lies in the intersection of some hyperbola H and P: Since both H
14 coX is a convex hull of X ½ Rn:
15 Denote y +X = fy + x : x 2 Xg, for any y 2 Rn and X ½ Rn:
12
u3
u1
u2
u
T+ u
L
PH Ç
nB
u*
Figure 1:
and P are 2-dimensional (n¡1 -dimensional) smooth surfaces of convex sets,
their intersection constitutes a 1-dimensional (n ¡ 2 -dimensional) Jordan
curve. Thus the intersection has a tangent (n ¡ 2 -dimensional supporting
hyperplane): Normalize the situation such that for any ¢ the distance be-
tween any two maximal points is
p
2 (
p
n ¡ 1): Let L denote the tangent at
u¤: Identify triangle T that is spanned by the maximal points of G: Then
the dimension of T is 2 (n ¡ 1). As ¢ goes to zero, the maximal distance
between T and L goes to zero. Thus T becomes embedded into L: But L’s
dimension is higher than T’s, thus embedding is impossible.
5 Relation to Krishna-Serrano (1996)
We now construct a game that closely parallels Krishna-Serrano (1996) [KS].
The only di¤erence is that we replace the "cake" structure of KS with the
more general U¡structure that allows externalities.
Take any S ½ N and u 2 U:Abusing the notation slightly, let V be the
13
N n S¡dimensional projection of U that keeps uS …xed:
V (uS) = fuNnS 2 RNnS : (uNnS; uS) 2 Ug:
The extensive form of the bargaining procedure in which set S of players
bargain over utility allocation in U will be denoted by ¡i(S;U ); and is de…ned
recursively.
Start by de…ning a two player bargaining game. For any two player
set fi; jg; let ¡i(fi; jg;V (uNnfi;jg)) denote the Rubinstein alternating o¤ers
game between i; j on projection V (uNnfi;jg) where i is the …rst mover.
For any S ½ N; i 2 N and u 2 U; de…ne ¡i(S;V (uNnS)) as follows:
In period 1 player i makes an o¤er uS 2 V (uNnS): All players j 2 S n fig
respond simultaneously by accepting or rejecting uS: If j 2 S accepts the
o¤er (uk)k2S; then he receives utility ui: Let A µ Snfig be the set of players
who accept the o¤er in period t: If A = S n fig; then all players, including
i; receive their shares immediately. If ? 6= A ½ S n fig; then in period 2;
¡j(S n A;V (uNnS)) is played where j is either the smallest index in S n A
greater than i; or, if i is the highest index in S n A; j is the smallest index
in S n A. If A = ?; then ¡j(S; V (uNnS)) is played in period 2:
For brevity, we concentrate on Markov equilibria of game ¡1(N;U ) where
i makes the same o¤er whenever it is his turn to make one, and any j 2 S
responds to o¤er made by i in the same way, in any subgame ¡i(S;V ) of
¡1(N; U). That is, i’s o¤er is conditional only on the subgame and j’s
response is conditional only on the subgame and the o¤er.
Before establishing the result, we specify some concepts. Without loss,
assume that ± = ±i for all i: For any i 2 S ½ N and u 2 U; denote by
ui(V (uNnS)) the i¡maximal point of a stable set related to V (uNnS). Set
G is now a stable set if and only if G = D(v) where v satis…es
vj = ±u
j
j(V (vNnfi;jg)); for all i 6= j:
Note that this implies that a stable set is consistent in the sense of Lensberg
(1988).16
Proposition 9 Any Markov equilibrium outcome of ¡1(N;U ) is a 1¡maximal
point of a stable set.
Proof. In any Markov equilibrium, 1’s o¤er is accepted. The set of
o¤ers that all j 6= 1 accept is written
V := fv : vj ¸ ±ujj(V (vNnf1;jg))g:
16 Who calls the property "stability".
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Let v¤ be an o¤er in the closure of V such that
v¤1 = supfv1 : v 2 V g:
By continuity of U; v¤j = ±u
j
j(V (v
1
Nnf1;jg)) for all j 6= 1:17 Then D(±v¤1; v¤2; :::; v¤n)
constitutes a stable set, and v¤ a 1¡maximal point of D(±v¤1; v¤2; :::; v¤n):
Proposition 10 There is maximal point u1 of a stable set that can be sup-
ported as a Markov equilibrium of ¡1(N; U):
Proof. Index each stable set by an element of an index set K .18 Identify
the 1¡maximal point u1(k) of stable set Gk for all k 2 K . Then there is
c := supfu11(k) : k 2 Kg: (14)
Hence there alsois sequence fklg such that fu1(kl)g converges to ¹u1 2 U
such that ¹u11 = c: By construction,
u1j(kl) = ±u
j
j(V (u
1(kl)Nnf1;jg)); for all kl = 1; :::; for all j:
Coordinate-wise convergence of u1(kl) implies that also
¹u1j = ±u
j
j(V (¹u
1
Nnf1;jg)); for all j:
Thus there is ¹k 2 K such that ¹u1 = u1(¹k):
We claim that 1’s o¤er ¹u1 can be supported as a Markov equilibrium of
¡1(N; U): Suppose not. By Rubinstein (1982), ui(V (uNnfi;jg)) constitutes
a Markov equilibrium of ¡i(fi; jg; V (uNnfi;jg)): Since ¹u1 = u1(¹k); no j 6= 1
bene…ts from unilaterally rejecting 1’s o¤er. We thus need to show that 1
can pro…tably deviate from o¤er ¹u1: Note that all j 6= 1 accept 1’s o¤er v
only if vj ¸ ±ujj(V (vNnf1;jg)) for all such j: De…ne
V := fv : vj ¸ ±ujj(V (vNnf1;jg))g:
Identify v1 2 V such that
v11 = supfv1 : v 2 V g:
17 If this were not the case, then there would be player j for who the inequality would
be strict. But this would allow improvement of 1’s payo¤ along the (1; j)¡projection of
U:
18 We are unable not to use the Axiom of Choice.
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Since ¹u1 cannot be supported as an equilibrium, V is nonempty and v11 >
¹u11: By continuity of U; v
1
j = ±u
j
j(V (v
1
Nnf1;jg)) for all j 6= 1: But then
D(±v11; v12; :::; v1n) constitutes a stable set, which contradicts (14). Thus ¹u1
can be supported as a Markov equilibrium of ¡1(N;U ):
Combining these propositions with our previous results gives some in-
teresting corollaries. Since a stable set converges to the Nash bargaining
solution u® as the time intervall becomes small, it follows by Proposition 9
that also all Markov equilibria associated to ¡1(N; U) converge to u®. On
the other hand, since a stable set always exists, Proposition 10 implies that
a Markov equilibrium associated to ¡1(N;U ) exists, too. To sum up:
Corollary 11 A Markov equilibrium of ¡1(N;U ) exists, and any Markov
equilibrium outcome of ¡1(N;U ) converges to u® as ¢ tends to zero.
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